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JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
This case comes to us on a writ of certiorari to the 
Virgin Islands Supreme Court.  Kamaal Francis was 
identified by an eyewitness as the triggerman in the fatal 
shooting of Omari Baltimore on St. Thomas.  Francis 
protested his innocence but admitted that he was present 
during the shooting and claimed that Jamal Justin Fahie 
wielded the weapon.  Both Fahie and Francis were later 
charged with the murder and related crimes.  Francis worked 
out a plea deal with the government.  In exchange for reduced 
charges, he agreed to testify against Fahie, which he did, 
swearing that Fahie was the sole shooter.  The jury found 
Fahie guilty as charged.  After an unsuccessful appeal to the 
V.I. Supreme Court, Fahie petitioned us for a writ of 
certiorari.  
 
We granted the petition and accepted the following 
two questions: (1) whether the V.I. Supreme Court erred in 
ruling that it was appropriate for the trial court to give an 
“aiding and abetting” instruction under the circumstances of 
this case; and (2) whether the V.I. Supreme Court used the 
correct standard to assess whether another supposed error in 
the jury instructions was harmless.  In addition to the briefing 
provided by the parties, the Virgin Islands Bar Association 
has filed an amicus brief challenging our jurisdiction to 
consider this matter at all.  For the reasons that follow, we 
conclude that we do have jurisdiction, that the ruling on the 
“aiding and abetting” instruction was proper, and that we 





I.   Background 
 
 A.   Factual Background 
 
 “On November 19, 2011 … Omari Baltimore was shot 
19 times while walking up Bunker Hill … on St. Thomas.”  
Fahie v. People, 62 V.I. 625, 628 (2015).  Carol Kelly, a 
resident of a nearby neighborhood, witnessed the murder.  Id.  
She called 911 to report the crime and, later that day, 
identified Kamaal Francis as the killer from a police photo 
array.  Id.  “The police arrested Francis the following day and 
charged him with first-degree murder and several other 
crimes.”  Id.  At first, Francis lied about his location and his 
involvement in the murder.  Id.  “However, [he] later recanted 
… and informed the police that he was at the scene of the 
shooting but that it was Jamal Fahie who shot Baltimore.”  Id.  
Francis explained that Fahie was motivated by gang-related 
animosity.  Id.  He also “gave a detailed description of how 
Fahie committed Baltimore’s murder as well as a description 
of what clothing Fahie was wearing at the time of the 
murder[.]”  Id. at 629.  Among other details, Francis noted 
that Fahie used a Glock firearm1 to commit the crime.  Id.  A 
subsequent ballistics analysis confirmed that a Glock was the 
murder weapon.   “Police authorities later found [the clothing 
that Francis had described] secreted in Fahie’s residence.”  Id.  
The clothes tested positive for gunpowder residue.  Id. 
                                              
1 “Glock” is the tradename of the Austrian firearm 
manufacturer Glock Ges.m.b.H.  Glock Gesellschaft m.b.H.: 






 B.   Procedural Background 
 
 Based on Francis’s statement, “the government filed a 
multi-count Information against ... Fahie and ... Francis[.]”2  
(Opening Br. at 3.)  Both men were charged with first degree 
murder, second degree murder, first degree assault, and three 
counts involving the unauthorized use of a firearm.3  Francis 
later agreed to plead guilty to the charges of accessory after 
the fact and misprision of a felony, to cooperate with the 
government, and to testify against Fahie at trial.  In exchange, 
                                              
2 An indictment is not required to level felony charges 
in the Virgin Islands.  “[T]he right of presentment by grand 
jury is merely a remedial right which is not among the 
fundamental rights which Congress in legislating for a 
territory not incorporated into the United States, such as the 
Virgin Islands, must secure to its inhabitants. ... [U]ntil 
Congress shall extend rights of this character to the 
inhabitants of [the] territory, the judicial system prevailing in 
such territory—not the system contemplated by the 
Constitution—is applicable and controlling.”  Rivera v. Gov’t 
of V.I., 375 F.2d 988, 991 (3d Cir. 1967) (internal quotations 
omitted).  Thus, “[defendants] may be prosecuted by 
information unless a local law requires [they] be prosecuted 
by grand jury.”  Simmonds v. People, 59 V.I. 480, 490 (2013) 
(quoting Codrington v. People, 57 V.I. 176, 196 (2012)). 
 
3 While “aiding and abetting” was not expressly 
charged as a separate count, the theory was included within 
the language of each of the charged counts.  The language 
was stricken in the Fourth Amended Information, but was 
subsequently added back into the Fifth Amended Information, 
as will be discussed in more detail hereafter.   
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the government agreed to drop the other charges against 
Francis and to recommend a sentence of five to ten years 
imprisonment for the accessory charge and three years’ for 
the misprision charge.   
 
Francis kept his end of the bargain.  He testified at trial 
that he and Fahie were together on the evening of the 
shooting and that they saw Baltimore walking towards the top 
of Bunker Hill.  Francis said that he and Fahie got a ride to 
the top of the hill from Karl Webbe, one of Francis’s friends, 
and that, during the ride, Fahie said “I’m gonna deal with this 
guy … [I’m gonna] kill him.” (JA at 415.)  At the high point 
of the road, Fahie got out of the car and ran up a flight of 
stairs to reach Baltimore, with Francis following.  Francis 
described what happened next: 
 
When we got to the top of the stairs Mr. Fahie 
then takes a black mask out of his pocket ... 
[and] took an extended [ammunition] clip out of 
his right back pocket. ... So, Mr. Fahie then puts 
his mask over his face and loads his clip, and he 
looks up, sees Baltimore and he sho[o]ts him. ... 
I was right behind him. 
 
(JA at 417-18.)  After the shooting, Francis said that they ran 
down the stairs and were driven away by Webbe.   
 
At trial, in addition to presenting Francis’s account of 
events and arguing that Fahie was the sole shooter, the 
government presented forensic experts who testified that 
Baltimore was shot nineteen times, that he died of his gunshot 
wounds, that each of the bullets was fired from the same gun, 
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and that the gun involved in the shooting was manufactured 
by Glock.   
 
Following the government’s presentation of its case, 
Fahie invoked Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 and 
moved for a judgment of acquittal on all counts, arguing that 
the government failed to present sufficient evidence on any 
count.  He emphasized that the government had not presented 
any evidence to support an aiding and abetting charge of 
liability.  The government opposed the Rule 29 motion but 
agreed to strike the aiding and abetting theory from the 
Information.  Fahie’s motion was held under advisement and 
subsequently denied.   
 
Relying on the testimony of Carol Kelly, Fahie 
mounted a defense which was, basically, that Francis 
committed the murder.  Kelly testified that she was walking 
up Bunker Hill when Francis passed her from behind.  She 
indicated that the shooting started about two minutes after 
Francis had passed her, and that she saw Francis fire at least 
some of the shots.  Kelly further recounted that she called 911 
after the shooting and identified Francis from a photo lineup.4   
                                              
4 While Kelly did not see a second shooter, much of 
her testimony suggests that two people were involved in the 
shooting: 
 
“Q: Was the person who was doing the 
shooting the same person who had passed you 
on the hill?  A: Initially, no.  He was the one 




After Fahie presented his case, the government 
advanced the Fifth Amended Information, which 
reincorporated the aiding and abetting theory of liability.  The 
amendment was evidently motivated by Kelly’s testimony.  
Over Fahie’s objection, the trial court allowed the amendment 
and instructed the jury on aiding and abetting as a theory of 
guilt.  The court also gave an anti-CSI instruction.  An “anti-
CSI” instruction states, in essence, that the government is not 
required to “employ any specific investigation technique 
[such as fingerprint analysis or DNA testing] or all possible 
investigative techniques to prove [its] case.”  (JA at 127.)  
                                                                                                     
“Q: Okay. And when you looked up 
from there tell the jury what you saw?  A: The 
gentleman who had pass[ed] me on the road 
was approaching a second person who had his 
arm extended and pointing across the road. Mr. 
Francis took one more step and then turned. The 
gunshots were continuing and there was a slight 
pause, and then Mr. Francis had the gun and 
walked across the road and shot four times into 
the body.  Q: Did you ever see more than one 
firearm?  A: No.”  (JA at 740);  
 
“Q: Okay.  So you had heard shots, at 
this point in time [Francis] wasn’t shooting, you 
saw an arm extended and heard shots; is that 
correct?  A: Correct.”  (JA at 744);  
 
“They stood over him and shot him four 
times.”  (911 Call of Carol Kelly at 4:18-4:28 




The name by which such instructions are known is a 
reference to the popular television series “CSI” and its 
spinoffs, which feature crime scene investigators using 
sophisticated forensic techniques to solve crimes.  The anti-
CSI instruction in this case told the jury that the government 
was “not required to gather or produce any specific type of 
evidence so long as [it] present[ed] sufficient evidence to 
convince [the members] beyond a reasonable doubt of 
[Fahie’s] guilt.”  (JA at 895-96.)  Fahie was found guilty on 
all counts.   
 
On appeal to the V.I. Supreme Court, Fahie challenged 
the trial court’s decision to, inter alia, include the aiding and 
abetting instruction and the anti-CSI instruction.  Fahie, 62 
V.I. at 629-30.  Both challenges were rejected.  With respect 
to the aiding and abetting instruction, the V.I. Supreme Court 
concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support a 
theory of aiding and abetting liability and that Fahie had been 
given adequate notice of the theory.  Id. at 633-35.  With 
respect to the anti-CSI instruction, it agreed that the trial court 
should not have included the instruction but concluded that 
the error was harmless.  Id. at 638. 
 
After the V.I. Supreme Court ruled against him, Fahie 
sought a writ of certiorari from us and we granted his petition, 
specifically as to the questions relating to the “aiding and 




II.   Discussion 
 
A.   Jurisdiction 
 
The V.I. Supreme Court had jurisdiction under 4 
V.I.C. § 32(a).  Fahie, 62 V.I. at 629.  Neither party contests 
our jurisdiction, but, in the role of amicus, the Virgin Islands 
Bar Association does, and, in any event, we have an 
obligation to consider it sua sponte.  Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 
Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 
(1982) (“[A] court, including an appellate court, will raise 
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on its own motion.”).   
 
Under the Revised Organic Act of 1984, we had, for a 
limited time, certiorari jurisdiction over “all final decisions of 
the highest court of the Virgin Islands from which a decision 
could be had.”5  48 U.S.C. § 1613 (1984 version) (amending 
                                              
5 Under the 1984 Act, “a dual system of local and 
federal judicial review in the Virgin Islands” was 
implemented, Parrott v. Gov’t of V.I., 230 F.3d 615, 619 (3d 
Cir. 2000), in which “‘the judicial power of the Virgin 
Islands’ [vested] in a ‘District Court of the Virgin Islands 
established by Congress, and in such appellate court and 
lower local courts as may have been or may hereafter be 
established by local law.’”  Pichardo v. V.I. Comm’r of 
Labor, 613 F.3d 87, 93 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting 48 U.S.C. 
§ 1611(a)).   
Within that system, the Superior Court of the Virgin 
Islands holds concurrent original jurisdiction with the District 
Court in all criminal actions.  4 V.I.C. § 76(b).  When the V.I. 
Supreme Court was established in 2004, cases from the 
Superior Court became appealable directly to it, as “the 
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the Revised Organic Act of the Virgin Islands).  That grant of 
jurisdiction, however, was designed to terminate when the 
V.I. Supreme Court “developed sufficient institutional 
traditions to justify direct review by the Supreme Court of the 
United States from all such final decisions.”  Pichardo v. V.I. 
Comm’r of Labor, 613 F.3d 87, 94 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting 48 
U.S.C. § 1613 (1984 version)). 
 
On December 28, 2012, the President of the United 
States signed into law the bill that became the current version 
of 48 U.S.C. § 1613, which provides formal recognition of 
the V.I. Supreme Court’s institutionally mature status and 
began the phasing out of our certiorari jurisdiction.  48 U.S.C. 
§ 1613 (2012 version) (amending the Revised Organic Act of 
the Virgin Islands).  Section 1613 revokes our certiorari 
jurisdiction over all cases “commenced on or after” 
December 28, 2012.  28 U.S.C. § 1260 note (2012) (“The 
amendments made by this Act [amending § 1613] apply to 
cases commenced on or after the date of the enactment of this 
Act.”). 
 
The dispute over our jurisdiction in this case centers on 
the meaning of the words “commenced on[.]”  Id.  The 
operative question is whether § 1613 revokes jurisdiction 
over cases commenced in the Superior Court on or after 
December 28, 2012, or whether the law only revokes 
                                                                                                     
supreme judicial power of the Territory.”  Pichardo, 613 F.3d 
at 94 (quoting 4 V.I.C. § 21).  We were given certiorari 
jurisdiction over the V.I. Supreme Court’s final decisions 





jurisdiction over cases that have commenced in our Court 
(through a petition for writ of certiorari) on or after that date.  
The Bar Association, expressing a desire to reduce the 
backlog of cases in the Virgin Islands court system, supports 
the latter interpretation.6  The choice of interpretation is 
relevant here because the case against Fahie commenced in 
the Superior Court in November 2011, but was not the subject 
of a petition to us until 2016.  
 
This is not the first time we have been asked to 
construe § 1613.  In North America Seafarers International 
Union ex rel. Bason v. Government of the Virgin Islands 
(“Bason”), we adopted the first of the two interpretations 
described above and expressly held that the statute eliminates 
jurisdiction over all cases commenced in the Superior Court 
after December 28, 2012.  767 F.3d 193, 205-06 (3d Cir. 
2014).  In that case, the original plaintiff, Bason, died during 
the pendency of an appeal for reinstatement to a previous 
employment position.  Id. at 195-200.  We eventually 
dismissed the case on mootness grounds, id. at 211, but we 
did so only after deciding the threshold jurisdictional question 
concerning § 1613, saying, “we conclude that we still possess 
                                              
6 The Bar Association argues that, if the first 
interpretation is adopted, our certiorari jurisdiction “will 
extend ... over Virgin Islands cases indefinitely” (Br. of 
Amicus Curiae at 19), because of significant delays in the 
Superior Court, where there are currently 6,000 pending 
cases, each taking on average 10 years for adjudication.  That 
result, says the Bar Association, would be “absurd ... given 
that the stated purpose of [the amendment to § 1613] ... was 




certiorari jurisdiction over proceedings that were filed in the 
Virgin Islands courts before [§ 1613’s] enactment date[.]”  Id. 
at 201.  We also said our decision was “[b]ased on the 
language of the statute, analogous legislation, and prior case 
law[.]”  Id. at 206. 
 
The Bar Association disagrees with Bason and argues 
that our analysis relating to jurisdiction “contravened the 
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court ... and the uncontradicted 
legislative history [of § 1613.]”  (Br. of Amicus Curiae at 2.)  
It also asserts that the jurisdictional analysis in Bason is non-
binding because the “unequivocal determination that the 
matter was moot by reason of Bason’s intervening death 
renders the remainder of the Bason decision dicta.”  (Id. at 4.)  
On those grounds, the Bar Association urges that we 
“overturn Bason[,]” and it says that we have “the complete 
freedom” to do so without requiring en banc review.  (Id. at 
3.)   
 
  No matter how we might now view Bason, however, 
the Bar Association is mistaken about our “complete 
freedom[.]”  (Id.)  We deliberately chose to assess the 
jurisdictional question as a threshold issue in Bason, 
recognizing that, “while threshold jurisdictional issues must 
ordinarily be decided before turning to the merits, ‘there is no 
mandatory sequencing of jurisdictional issues.’”7  767 F.3d at 
                                              
7 The Bar Association acknowledges that reasoning, 
but argues that “[t]hat principle has no application ... when 
subject matter jurisdiction is absent.”  (Br. of Amicus Curiae 
at 8.)  Essentially, it is arguing that we treat mootness as a 
threshold threshold question, or that there is a threshold 
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202 n.3 (quoting Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l 
Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431 (2007) (further quotations 
omitted)).  Then after extensive analysis, we concluded that 
the words “cases commenced” were a reference “to the filing 
of a complaint in the Virgin Islands Superior Court.”  Id. at 
206 (quotation and alteration omitted).  That ruling was not 
merely non-binding dicta, and it remains the law in our 
Circuit.8  Thus, while we are grateful for the interest and 
assistance of the Bar Association, we cannot accept its 
argument.  According to Bason, we have jurisdiction over 
Fahie’s claims.  
 
B.   Inclusion of the “Aiding and Abetting” 
 Instruction 
 
Fahie objects to the inclusion of the “aiding and 
abetting” instruction, not to its content, so we are not asked to 
review the legal accuracy of the instruction, which would call 
for de novo review.  Gov’t of V.I. v. Isaac, 50 F.3d 1175, 
1180 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[W]here ... the question is whether the 
jury instructions failed to state the proper legal standard, this 
                                                                                                     
hierarchy, but it fails to substantiate that argument with any 
case law and we are unpersuaded. 
 
8 Even if we were to agree that Bason was wrongly 
decided, we are not at liberty to overturn the holding without 
en banc review because it is not dicta.  Mariana v. Fisher, 
338 F.3d 189, 201 (3d Cir. 2003).  We have already denied 
such a petition previously.  Sur Petition for Rehearing, North 
America Seafarers Int’l Union ex rel. Bason v. Gov’t of the 




court’s review is plenary.”).  Instead, we review for abuse of 
discretion the trial court’s decision to include the instruction 
at all.  Cf. id. (“Generally, we review the district court’s 
refusal to give certain jury instructions on an abuse of 
discretion basis.”); see also United States v. Moreno, 727 
F.3d 255, 261 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[I]n the absence of a 
misstatement [within the jury instructions] we review for 
abuse of discretion.” (quotation omitted)).   
 
“When jury instructions are challenged, ‘we consider 
the totality of the instructions and not a particular sentence or 
paragraph in isolation.’”  United States v. Thayer, 201 F.3d 
214, 221 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Coyle, 63 
F.3d 1239, 1245 (3d Cir. 1995)), abrogated on other grounds 
by Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010).  “The issue 
is ‘whether, viewed in light of the evidence, the charge as a 
whole fairly and adequately submits the issues in the case to 
the jury.’”  Id. (quoting United States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 
1252, 1264 (3d Cir. 1995)).   
 
Fahie advances two challenges to the “aiding and 
abetting” instruction.  First, he argues that it was erroneous 
because it was given “despite the fact that the government 
never presented [an aiding and abetting] theory at trial.”  
(Opening Br. at 14.)  Second, he argues that the instruction is 
problematic because Francis pled guilty to being an accessory 
after the fact, effectively eliminating the possibility of Francis 
being a principal for Fahie to “aid or abet” in the shooting.  
(Id. at 14, 16-19); see also Gov’t of V.I. v. Aquino, 378 F.2d 
540, 553 (3d Cir. 1967) (“By definition, an accessory after the 
fact is one who stands outside the commission of the 
substantive crime, for his offense consists of what he does, 
after he knows it has been committed, to aid the offender to 
 16 
 
avoid apprehension or punishment.”).  We address those 
arguments in turn. 
 
Fahie says that the instruction was erroneous because 
it was included even though the government did not present 
an aiding and abetting theory.9  But the record demonstrates 
that the government did, in fact, present an aiding and 
abetting theory to the jury.  In its closing statement, the 
government discussed Kelly’s testimony and drew the jury’s 
attention to the portions of her statement that refer to two 
shooters.  (See JA at 873-74, 876.)10  The government laid the 
groundwork for that argument when it questioned Kelly.  (JA 
at 744, 751.)11  The record thus shows that the government 
                                              
9 The government seems to agree that it did not pursue 
the theory.  (See Answering Br. at 8 (“The record indicates 
that the Information was revised prior to jury deliberations, 
which reflects the People’s decision not to pursue an aiding 
and abetting charge.”) (citing JA at 52-54).)  But we take that 
as an admission that it did not pursue the theory in its case-in-
chief.  It did in fact present the theory following Kelly’s 
testimony.   
 
10 JA at 873-74 (“Listen to her reference of ‘they’ 
during the course of that 9-1-1 call. ... [S]he saw an arm 
extended and heard shots firing at the same time from the 
very stairwell where Kamaal Francis said Jamal Fahie was.”); 
JA at 876 (“[W]hat we heard from Carol Kelly was consistent 
with what you heard from Mr. Francis[.]”). 
 
11 JA at 744 (“Q: And you looked up, was the arm that 
you saw extended [shooting], was it extended at that point in 
time?  A: Yes.  Q: And at that point in time did you see where 
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indeed did contend that Fahie was, at the very least, involved 
in the shooting as an aider and abettor, and there was 
sufficient evidence to support an instruction to the jury to that 
effect.12    
 
That the government did not use the phrase “aiding 
and abetting” when talking to the jury does not mean the 
judge was precluded from including the instruction.  See 
United States v. Gordon, 812 F.2d 965, 969 (5th Cir. 1987) 
(“The words ‘aid and abet’ need not appear in the indictment 
in order to sustain a conviction as an aider and abettor ... 
‘[O]ne who has been indicted as a principal may be convicted 
on evidence showing that he has merely aided and abetted the 
commission of the offense.’”) (quoting United States v. Vines, 
                                                                                                     
Mr. Francis went?  A: He was still approaching the corner of 
the building.  Q: Okay.  And that’s before, as you testified, 
you saw him fire four, five shots?  A: Yes.”); JA at 751 (“Q: 
After th[at] final set of shots, where did the individuals go?  
A: They both ran down the stairwell.  Q: Okay.  So the 
individual whose arm you saw extended, he travel[ed] down 
the stairwell?  A: Yes.  Q: And Mr. Francis you said also 
traveled down the stairwell; is that correct?  A: Yes.”). 
   
12 Carol Kelly’s testimony strongly suggests that there 
were two shooters.  See supra n.4.  Her testimony, even when 
compared to countervailing evidence, was sufficient to allow 
a reasonable jury to find Fahie guilty of aiding and abetting 
the criminal activity.  Additionally, the testimony of Francis 
and Webbe, as well as forensic evidence, added to the 
sufficiency of the evidence, and the court acknowledged that 




580 F.2d 850, 853 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 991 
(1978)).  The government communicated its intent to argue 
the aiding and abetting theory when it amended the 
Information to include aiding and abetting as a basis for 
criminal liability and when it requested that the judge add an 
aiding and abetting instruction to the jury charge.  Fahie was 
thus on notice that the government was indeed relying on that 
theory.   
 
The second argument Fahie advances is that the 
instruction is problematic because “legally, there was no one 
for Fahie to ‘aid and abet’” since Francis was, by virtue of his 
plea agreement, an accessory after the fact, which precluded 
any consideration of him as a participant in the shooting.  
(Opening Br. at 14, 19.)  Essentially, Fahie argues that 
Francis’s plea to being an accessory after the fact confined 
the government’s proof at Fahie’s trial.  By Fahie’s lights, 
since an accessory after the fact “[b]y definition ... is one who 
stands outside the commission of the substantive crime ... [,]” 
Aquino, 378 F.2d at 553; see also 14 V.I.C. § 12(a) (defining 
accessory after the fact as having the same mens rea 
requirement under Virgin Islands law), Francis could not be a 
participant in the shooting and there was no one for Fahie to 
aid and abet in the murder.13 
 
                                              
13 Fahie confusingly makes his argument by focusing 
substantial portions of his briefing on Francis’s inability to be 
an aider and abettor to Fahie, but the focus here is on whether 
Fahie could be found guilty of aiding and abetting in the 
murder, not on whether Francis could be found guilty under 




 That argument has a certain superficial appeal but is 
flawed.  It rests on an improper understanding of judicial 
estoppel.14  The fact that the government negotiates a plea 
does not mean that the government is required to treat all 
aspects of that plea as binding in future prosecutions.  Such a 
requirement could unnecessarily tie the hands of prosecutors 
who gain a greater understanding of the facts over time, and it 
                                              
14 Judicial estoppel is triggered when a court deals with 
inconsistent positions taken by a party.  See Carlyle Inv. 
Mgmt. LLC v. Moonmouth Co. SA, 779 F.3d 214, 221-22 (3d 
Cir. 2015) (“The doctrine of judicial estoppel prevents a party 
from prevailing in one phase of a case on an argument and 
then relying on a contradictory argument to prevail in another 
phase.”) (citation omitted).  That doctrine 
 
requires that: (1) a party adopts a position 
clearly inconsistent with an earlier position and 
(2) the party had succeeded in persuading a 
court to accept that party’s earlier position, so 
that judicial acceptance of an inconsistent 
position in a later proceeding would create “the 
perception that either the first or the second 
court was misled.” 
        
Id. (quoting New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750 
(2001)).  Thus, “absent any good explanation, a party should 
not be allowed to gain an advantage by litigation on one 
theory, and then seek an inconsistent advantage by pursuing 
an incompatible theory.”  In re Kane, 628 F.3d 631, 638 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (quoting Krystal Cadillac-Oldsmobile GMC Truck, 




could yield unfair windfalls for later defendants.  “Judicial 
estoppel is only appropriate when the inconsistent positions 
are tantamount to a knowing misrepresentation to or even 
fraud on the court.”  Krystal Cadillac-Oldsmobile GMC 
Truck, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 337 F.3d 314, 324 (3d Cir. 
2003) (internal quotations omitted).  The government’s 
position here does not amount to anything of the kind.   
 
Two analogous cases are persuasive in this regard.  In 
Standefer v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld an 
aiding and abetting conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2, despite 
the principal defendant’s having been acquitted of the 
offense.  447 U.S. 10, 11-14 (1980).  The Court concluded 
that, “[under § 2] ... all participants in conduct violating a 
federal criminal statute are ‘principals[,]’ [and] [a]s such, they 
are punishable for their criminal conduct; the fate of other 
participants is irrelevant.”15  Id. at 20.  Later, in Smith v. 
State, the Indiana Supreme Court rejected a defendant’s 
argument that judicial estoppel barred the government “from 
seeking an instruction on accomplice liability because it 
agreed to a guilty plea from another defendant on a theory of 
the facts that was allegedly inconsistent with Smith’s being an 
accomplice to the killing.”  765 N.E.2d 578, 581 (Ind. 2002).  
The court said, “[w]e do not believe the acceptance of a plea 
bargain from [the other defendant] on one theory of the case 
                                              
15 Fahie was convicted as an aider and abettor under 14 
V.I.C. § 11.  That statute was modeled after 18 U.S.C. § 2.  
See Todman v. People, 59 V.I. 675, 683 (V.I. 2013) (noting 
that 14 V.I.C. § 11 was modeled on 18 U.S.C. § 2, and 
indicating that the logic of Standefer applies with equal force 




and the prosecution of Smith in a separate action on an 
alternate theory can be construed as ‘playing fast and loose’ 
with the courts.”  Id. at 584; see also In re J.W.S., 825 P.2d 
125, 128 (Kan. 1992) (rejecting the argument that “once the 
prosecution permits one of two codefendants to plead guilty 
to aiding and abetting, then it is locked into proving the 
second defendant is the principal.”).  At least on the facts 
here, we agree with that reasoning.16 
 
 We therefore reject Fahie’s argument that judicial 
estoppel is applicable to bar the aiding and abetting theory in 
this case.  There is enough evidence in the record to show that 
a theory of aiding and abetting was, in fact, presented at trial, 
and we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s 
decision to give an aiding and abetting instruction. 
 
                                              
16 Our holding does not mean that there is no role for 
judicial estoppel in constraining government theories of 
culpability.  See, e.g., Drake v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1449, 1478-
79 (11th Cir. 1985) (finding a due process violation where a 
prosecutor convicted one defendant of murder and then used 
that defendant’s testimony (from his first trial, in which he 
attempted to demonstrate his innocence by pinning the blame 
on someone else) to convict another defendant for the same 
murder, explaining, “the prosecutor either believed or did not 
believe [the first defendant].  If he did believe him, then the 
prosecutor should not have prosecuted [him] ... If he did not 
believe [him], then the prosecutor used testimony he thought 
was false in order to convict [the other defendant], a 




C.   The Anti-CSI Instruction 
 
 The second question on which we granted certiorari 
concerns the use of an anti-CSI instruction and whether the 
V.I. Supreme Court applied the correct “harmless error” 
standard after finding the instruction was erroneous.  On 
further consideration, we believe that the writ was, in that 
regard, improvidently granted.  Because the propriety of an 
anti-CSI instruction is fundamentally a matter of Virgin 
Islands law, and not a matter of federal concern, we will 
vacate the writ of certiorari as it pertains to that question.  
 
 Our review of the briefing, record, and oral argument 
convinces us that the V.I. Supreme Court’s determination that 
the anti-CSI instruction was error is a point of territorial law 
on evidence.  The parties themselves agree on that,17 and they 
appear to be right, since the language of the V.I. Supreme 
Court’s decision focuses on Virgin Islands precedent rather 
                                              
17 See Oral Argument at 13:15-13:26, Fahie v. People 
of V.I. (No. 15-2721), http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/ 
oralargument/audio/15-2721Fahiev.PeopleofVI.mp3 (Fahie 
arguing that the V.I. Supreme Court was interpreting Virgin 
Islands law and “[the V.I.] Supreme Court is still free to 
determine that [the] instruction is improper in the Virgin 
Islands.  It is not bound by the Third Circuit[.]”); id. at 15:41-
16:51, 20:15-21:13, 22:39-24:10 (Fahie arguing that the 
assumption of error in question two is under Virgin Islands 
law and based on Virgin Islands jurisprudence); id. at 34:00-
35:17 (the People arguing that “the [V.I.] Supreme Court is 
well within their rights ... that it was a state level argument 




than constitutional principles.  Fahie, 62 V.I. at 636 
(“Although we have not previously addressed the validity of 
an instruction informing the jury that the People [were] not 
required to produce specific scientific evidence, this Court 
has noted that when the trial court comments on the evidence, 
or the absence of evidence, it risks invading the exclusive 
province of the jury to decide what conclusions should be 
drawn from evidence admitted at trial.”) (citations omitted).   
 
In addition, a review of the factors provided in our 
local rules to guide our discretion in granting certiorari 
suggests that certiorari on this question is better withheld.  3d 
Cir. L.A.R. 112.1 (2011).  Specifically, those factors are: 
 
(1) The Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands 
has decided a question in a way that conflicts 
with applicable decisions of this court, other 
appellate courts, or the United States Supreme 
Court.  (2) The Supreme Court of the Virgin 
Islands has so far departed from the accepted 
and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so 
far sanctioned such a departure by a lower 
court, as to call for an exercise of this court’s 
powers of review.  (3) The Supreme Court of 
the Virgin Islands has decided an important 
question of federal or territorial law that has not 
been, but should be, decided by this court.  (4) 
The Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands was 
without jurisdiction of the case, or where, 
because of disqualifications or other reason, the 
decision of the Supreme Court of the Virgin 
Islands lacks the concurrence of the required 




Id.  None of those factors appear to be applicable to the V.I. 
Supreme Court’s ruling on this issue. 
 
“Examination of a case ... on oral argument, may bring 
into ‘proper focus’ a consideration which, though present in 
the record at the time of granting the writ, only later indicates 
that the grant was improvident.”  The Monrosa v. Carbon 
Black Exp., Inc., 359 U.S. 180, 184 (1959).  That is the 
circumstance we are in.  “Now that plenary consideration has 
shed more light on this case than in the nature of things was 
afforded at the time the petition for certiorari was 
considered,” Belcher v. Stengel, 429 U.S. 118, 119-20 (1976) 
(citing Monrosa, 359 U.S. at 183-84), we have concluded that 
the writ should be vacated as improvidently granted to the 
extent it dealt with the anti-CSI instruction. 
 
III.   Conclusion 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we have jurisdiction; we 
will affirm the ruling on the aiding and abetting instruction; 
and we will vacate as improvidently granted the writ of 
certiorari as it pertains to the anti-CSI instruction. 
